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This paper elaborates upon occupations, work relations, work settings, and their connection
with organised crime activities. The analysis is based upon data from 120 case studies from
the Dutch Organised Crime Monitor, involving 1623 suspects. The paper describes the
different kinds of occupations encountered in cases of organised crime and the main
characteristics of these occupations. Furthermore, the paper describes in more detail four
cases of organised crime that illustrate the embeddedness of certain organised crime activities
in work relations and work settings. Following Mars,1 the paper analyses both the grid
dimension and the group dimension of certain occupations and work settings. The paper
concludes that social relations as well as settings and opportunity structures provide structure
to the organisation of many forms of crime, including organised crime.
Keywords: organised crime; occupations; opportunity theory; social network analysis;
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1. Organised crime, occupations and opportunity
Criminal career research has made great progress over the last two decades, yet many studies
still focus primarily on juveniles, adolescents, and high-volume crime.2 The abundance of
longitudinal research into these mainstream issues is not paralleled by a similar abundance of
thorough empirical research into different types of offenders, particularly adult offenders, and
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1. Gerald Mars,Cheats at Work: An Anthropology ofWorkplace Crime (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1982).
2. E.g. Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, Jeffrey A. Roth and Christy A. Visher, eds., Criminal Careers
and Career Criminals (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986); Terence P. Thornberry, ed.,
Developmental Theories of Crime and Delinquency, Advances in Criminological Theory, Vol. 7
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Marc LeBlanc and Rolf Loeber, ‘Developmental
Criminology Updated’, in Crime and Justice: Review of Research 23, ed. Michael Tonry (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1998): 155–98; Alex R. Piquero, David P. Farrington and Alfred Blumstein, ‘The
Criminal Career Paradigm: Background and Recent Developments’, in Crime and Justice. A Review of
Research 30, ed. Michael Tonry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003): 137–83; David P. Farrington,
‘Developmental and Life-Course Criminology: Key Theoretical and Empirical Issues – the 2002 Sutherland
Award Address’, Criminology 41 (2003): 221–55; David P. Farrington, ed., Integrated Developmental and
Life-Course Theories of Offending. Advances in Criminological Theory, Vol. 14. (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Publishers, 2005); John H. Laub, ‘Edwin Sutherland and the Michael-Adler Report: Searching for
the Soul of Criminology Seventy Years Later’,Criminology44 (2006): 235–58; Terrie E. Moffitt, ‘A Review of
Research on the Taxonomy of Life-Course Persistent and Adolescence-Limited Offending’, in Taking Stock:
The Status of Criminological Theory.Advances inCriminological Theory, Vol. 15, eds. Francis T. Cullen, John
Paul Wright and Kristie R. Blevins (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 502–21; Akiva M.
Liberman, ed., The Long View of Crime: A Synthesis of Longitudinal Research (New York: Springer, 2008).’
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different kinds of crime, particularly organised crime and white-collar crime.3 However, recent
research into criminal careers in organised crime has generated several interesting findings that
challenge basic received wisdoms of criminal career research. Quantitative and qualitative
research into the criminal careers of about 1000 offenders who were involved in 80 extensively
analysed cases of organised crime draws attention to people – without any appreciable
criminal history – in conventional jobs who switch careers, also later in life.4 For instance, a
significant number of (ring) leaders and nodal offenders had made a switch from a legal
occupational background to organised crime. Furthermore, the involvement of several starters
in organised crime was explained by work-related contacts, underlying criminal co-operation.
These research findings suggest that occupations,5 work relations and work settings might be
salient in promoting certain pathways into organised crime.
Many studies on organised crime tend to draw a sharp distinction between licit and illicit
activities and between the legitimate world and the underworld. Some studies focus on
infiltration of licit economic sectors by organised crime, while other studies tend to stress
symbiosis and ‘interfaces’ between legal and illegal actors. Passas,6 for instance, developed a
typology of various connections between legal and illegal actors, from antithetical to
symbiotic interfaces.
In this paper, we elaborate upon occupations, work relations, work settings, and their
connection with organised crime activities. The analysis is based upon the data from 120 case
studies from the Dutch Organised Crime Monitor, involving 1623 suspects (Section 1.1).
Section 1.2 describes the different kinds of occupations encountered in cases of organised crime
and the main characteristics of these occupations. Section 1.3 describes in more detail four cases
of organised crime that illustrate the embeddedness of certain organised crime activities in work
relations and work settings.7 Our cases include several striking examples of organised crime
3. E.g. David Weisburd and Elin Waring, White-Collar Crime and Career Criminals (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001); Nicole Leeper Piquero and Michael L. Benson, ‘White Collar Crime
and Criminal Careers: Specifying a Trajectory of Punctuated Situational Offending’, Journal of
Contemporary Criminal Justice 20 (2004): 148–65; Letizia Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime,
Italian Style (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Nicholas Dorn, Michael Levi, and Leslie King,
‘Literature Review on Upper Level Drug Trafficking’, in Home Office Online Report 22/05 (London: Home
Office, 2005); Carlo Morselli, ‘Structuring Mr. Nice: Entrepreneurial Opportunities and Brokerage
Positioning in the Cannabis Trade’, Crime, Law and Social Change 35 (2001): 203–44; Ibid., ‘Career
Opportunities and Network-Based Privileges in the Cosa Nostra’, Crime, Law and Social Change 39
(2003): 383–418; Ibid., Contacts, Opportunities, and Criminal Enterprise (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2005); Darrell Steffensmeier and Jeffery T. Ulmer, Confessions of a Dying Thief: Understanding
Criminal Careers and Criminal Enterprise (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Aldine, 2005); Neal Shover
and Andy Hochstetler, Choosing White-Collar Crime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
4. See, Edward R. Kleemans and Christianne J. De Poot, ‘Criminal Careers in Organized Crime and
Social Opportunity Structure’, European Journal of Criminology 5 (2008).
5. For the complex relationship between crime and work, see, Jeffrey Fagan and Richard B. Freeman,
‘Crime and Work’, in Crime and Justice. A Review of Research 25, ed. Michael Tonry (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1999), 225–90; Akiva M. Liberman, ed., The Long View of Crime: A Synthesis of
Longitudinal Research (New York: Springer, 2008).
6. Nikos Passas, ‘Cross-Border Crime and the Interface between Legal and Illegal Actors’, Security
Journal, no. 16 (2003): 19–38.
7. In the criminological literature, ‘occupational crime’ involves crimes committed as a result of an
opportunity presented during lawful professional practice, e.g. Garry Green, Occupational Crime (Chicago,
IL: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1997), for example, corruption by civil servants, environmental pollution and
fraud. The term ‘workplace crime’ relates to conventional crimes (for example, abuse or stealing from a
colleague) that are committed at work. These crimes are not necessarily connected to a specific opportunity
that is presented by a specific occupation.
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activities that are embedded in the existing work relations and work settings. These cases do not
concern ‘interfaces’ between criminal businesses and legitimate occupations, yet offenders who
engage in organised crime in the context of their daily work. For instance, airline staff members
who engage in smuggling cocaine or a group of financial and tax advisors who – in the
slipstream of their legitimate activities – systematically collaborate to defraud the tax
authorities. Following Mars,8 this section analyses both the grid dimension and group dimension
of certain occupations and work settings. The paper ends with a reflection on the most important
research findings (Section 2).
1.1 Data: Dutch organised crime monitor
The main sources for this ongoing research project are files of closed Dutch police
investigations of criminal groups, often spanning a period of several years.9 From 1996 to
2006, we systematically analysed 120 large-scale investigations (40 case studies per sweep).
Each case study always starts with structured interviews with police officers and public
prosecutors. After these interviews we analyse and summarise the police files. When
describing and analysing these files, an extensive checklist is used that elaborates upon the
following leading questions: What is the composition of the group and how do offenders
cooperate? What kinds of illegal activities do they engage in and how do they operate? How do
they interact with the opportunities and risks presented by their environment? What are the
proceeds of the criminal activities and how do they spend these proceeds? Unobtrusive police
methods, such as transcripts of wiretaps and data obtained from police observations, and
interrogations of victims and offenders, often provide us with a detailed and interesting picture
of the social world of organised crime.
Following three data sweeps, we have now collected a wide cross-section of 120 cases about
the various forms of organised crime,10 involving 1623 suspects. The major areas of business of
organised crime groups in The Netherlands boil down to ‘transit crime’: international smuggling
activities – drug trafficking, smuggling illegal immigrants, human trafficking for sexual
exploitation, arms trafficking, trafficking in stolen vehicles, and other transnational illegal
8. Mars, Cheats at Work.
9. For more information, see, Edward R. Kleemans and Henk Van de Bunt, ‘The Social Embeddedness of
Organized Crime’, Transnational Organized Crime 9 (1999): 19–36; Ibid., ‘The Social Organisation of
Human Trafficking’, in Global Organized Crime: Trends and Developments, ed. Dina Siegel, Henk Van de
Bunt, and Damia´n Zaitch (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003); Henk Van de Bunt and Edward
R. Kleemans, ‘Transnational Organized Crime: New Directions for Empirical Research and Public Policy’,
in Punishment, Places, and Perpetrators: Developments in Criminology and Criminal Justice Research,
eds. Gerben Bruinsma, Henk Elffers, and Jan de Keijser (Collumpton: Willan Publishing, 2004): 198–211.
10. In the literature, we find a continually recurring discussion on whether organized crime should be
defined in terms of characteristics of groups or of criminal activities. For an overview, see, Letizia Paoli,
‘The Paradoxes of Organized Crime’, Crime, Law and Social Change 37 (2002): 51–97; Cyrille Fijnaut and
Letizia Paoli, eds., Organized Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European
Union and Beyond (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004). In the organised crime monitor, organised crime is mainly
distinguished from terrorism, corporate crime, group crime and other types of crime by the characteristics of
the groups involved. Following the Fijnaut research group, Cyrille Fijnaut et al., Organised Crime in the
Netherlands (The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998), groups are considered as
organised crime groups when they are focused primarily on obtaining illegal profits; systematically commit
crimes with serious damage for society; and are reasonably capable of shielding their criminal activities
from the authorities. Shielding illegal activities from the authorities is made possible by using various
strategies such as: corruption, violence, intimidation, storefronts, communication in codes, counter
surveillance, media manipulation, the use of experts such as notaries public, lawyers, accountants.
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activities, such as money laundering and evasion of taxes (cigarette smuggling, European
Community fraud, for example).11
It is important to note here that – compared to other countries – Dutch criminal
investigations provide a lot of ‘objective’ evidence on offender behaviour, due to the extensive
use of wiretapping, observation techniques and other special investigation methods, and the
absence of plea bargaining. Having access to the original police files, the evidence can be
checked to a large extent by the researchers themselves.
1.2 Occupations as the basis for criminal co-operation
Between 1730 and 1778 bands of mobile bandits, publicly known as the ‘Bokkeryders’,
terrorised the lower Meuse, the rural area enclosed by the towns of Maastricht
(The Netherlands), Aix-la-Chapelle, Gulik, and Roermond.12 In the middle of the night, they
staged (violent) raids against churches, farms, inns, rectories, and monasteries. It took the
authorities of this area, fragmented into several jurisdictions, more than forty years to contain
this form of banditry, through arrests, trials and executions on a massive scale in the hometowns
of the accused.
Analysing the history of Bokkeryders, Blok13 investigated among other things the
occupational background of these robbers. They turned out not to be mobile bandits, lacking
hearth and home, but ordinary people with local roots, often having a home, a wife and children.
They were born and raised in the same area, where the robberies occurred and were often
familiar with their victims in their daily lives. The majority of the offenders were artisans
(skinners, saddlers, shoemakers, iron-workers, spinners, weavers) and retail merchants
(peddlers, carters, cattle dealers).14 Blok suggests that this overrepresentation15 is probably
due to the opportunities these occupations offered for these specific criminal activities. Skinners,
for instance, played a dominant role in these criminal groups. It was their job to kill sick animals,
to dispose the dead cattle, to flay horses, and to remove the other organic remnants from public
areas.16 Being on the road frequently, day and night, they acquired much knowledge about the
area and about potential victims and targets, and they did not evoke suspicion, when travelling at
night, transporting bags with loot.
11. This type of organised crime is primarily concerned with the provision of illegal goods and services.
Hence, transit crime differs fundamentally from the archetype of organised crime that dominates the North
American literature: ‘Mafia-type’ organisations which have gained control of certain economic sectors or
regions, acting as ‘alternative government’, Paoli, ‘The Paradoxes of Organized Crime’, 71; Fijnaut and
Paoli, eds., Organized Crime in Europe, 603–21; Edward R. Kleemans, ‘Organized Crime, Transit Crime,
and Racketeering’, in Crime and Justice in the Netherlands. Crime and Justice. A Review of Research,
ed. Michael Tonry and Catrien Bijleveld (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 163–215.
12. Florike Egmond, Underworlds. Organised Crime in the Netherlands, 1650–1800 (Cambridge, MA:
Polity Press, 1993); Anton Blok, Honour and Violence (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2001).
13. Blok, Honour and Violence, 29–68.
14. Lange discusses the occupational background of the members of four German groups from around the
same period and particularly reveals the overrepresentation of mobile professions. Besides the
opportunities that these professions offer for criminal activities, Lange stresses social exclusion too, Katrin
Lange, ‘Many a Lord is Guilty, Indeed for Many a Poor Man’s Dishonest Deed: Gangs of Robbers in Early
Modern Germany’, in Organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the
European Union and Beyond, ed. Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004), 113–21.
15. In those times, the majority of people were farmers or day labourers. Only 20% of the robbers fell into
this occupational category.
16. They also assisted the executioner in torture, in his work on the scaffold, and in transporting and
burying executed people.
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Furthermore, Blok17 concludes that occupations influenced the places where people lived as
well as their marriage opportunities, particularly for infamous occupations such as ‘ritual
unclean’ skinners. As a consequence, these artisans constituted a widespread, regional and
endogamous network. The bands in the first periods were characterised by various family
relations, including the involvement of wives, sisters and daughters.18 Work, social and criminal
ties were interconnected and criminal cooperation was facilitated by the opportunities provided
by work relations and work settings.
1.2.1 Occupational backgrounds in organised crime
Analyzing all 120 cases of the Organised Crime Monitor, we listed all the occupations of the
1623 suspects, if known.19 Obviously, this list of occupations is far more heterogeneous than the
list produced by Blok on the agricultural society of the 18th century. The 120 cases are also far
more heterogeneous than the criminal gangs that Blok analysed.
The list features a very wide range of occupations and professions, from cleaner to
company director. Further consideration shows that, despite diversity, there are several
common characteristics. First, the most important common characteristic is that a relatively
large number of occupations involve some degree of mobility, transport or logistics: taxi
driver, car dealer, truck driver, director of a transport company, garage owner, warehouse
employee, dock worker, owner of a camper leasing company, director of a container business,
(airport) baggage handler, or steward. A second characteristic is that, in many cases, these
offenders are not in salaried employment, and are able to operate relatively independently
because of the nature of their job or their (hierarchical) position. This refers to directors of
businesses (usually small ones), independent professionals (tax adviser, lawyer, accountant,
pharmacist) and, in a few cases, to senior individuals in companies and banks. Thirdly, it is
striking that a relatively large number of occupations are ‘social’, facilitating the search for
suitable co-offenders. Added to the taxi drivers and lawyers already mentioned, these
occupations include employees and owners of cannabis outlets (coffee shops), sex club
operators, porters, bodyguards, bar owners, disco owners, gold dealers, and directors of car
lease businesses.
The list of occupations provided above represents just an inventory of the occupations
practised by the various offenders. There are several ways in which occupations and criminal
activities may be interrelated. First, occupations or legal activities may be a cover-up for
criminal activities. For instance, in one of our cases a video shop is used as a cover for
underground banking.20 Secondly, occupations, professions or businesses may be involved in
criminal activities through specific expertise or facilitating services. For instance, a transport
company that transports drugs from Morocco, or a lawyer who performs illegal activities for
his client. A third kind of involvement is the major focus of this paper: the embeddedness of
criminal activities in work relations. The social embeddedness of many organised crime
17. Blok, Honour and Violence, 33.
18. Ibid., 32–5.
19. We listed the occupations mentioned in the police files. Hence, occupation may relate to education or to
licit activities before or during the engagement in criminal activities. Furthermore, the cases contain a large
number of suspects without an occupation or with unknown occupational background. Practising an
occupation is by no means necessary for engaging in organised crime activities.
20. See for more case material from the Organised Crime Monitor on underground banking, Henk Van de
Bunt, ‘The Role of Hawala Bankers in the Transfer of Proceeds from Organized Crime’, in Organized
Crime: Culture, Markets and Policies, ed. Dina Siegel and Hans Nelen (New York: Springer Sciences and
Business Media, 2008).
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activities is rather well-documented.21 The next section focuses on criminal activities that are
embedded in work relations and work settings. We will elaborate in more detail on four
specific cases, describing both the grid and group dimensions of certain occupations and work
settings.22
1.3 Criminal cooperation within work settings
All occupations present specific opportunities for criminal behaviour. For example, knowledge
or contacts obtained during licit activities may be used for criminal purposes. Related to
transit crime, certain occupations are a fertile breeding ground for illegal smuggling activities.
For example, one of the main figures in a major cannabis smuggling operation had at some
point in his previous life been a fruit dealer and had done a lot of business with Morocco and
Lebanon. Based on his social contacts and logistical knowledge, he was soon able to organise
a brisk cannabis importation operation from Lebanon and Morocco. This is a simple example
of how licit activities provide the opportunities as well as the social contacts needed for
illegal activities.
Several cases illuminate how colleagues can ultimately become ‘partners in crime’.23 Case 1
is an example of normal licit activities which provide opportunities for systematically smuggling
drugs:
This case essentially relates to the transportation of ecstasy pills in the so-called pilot trolleys from
The Netherlands to the United States by airline staff. Furthermore, cocaine is transported from the
Caribbean to The Netherlands. Money is also smuggled back to The Netherlands.
The collaborative venture involves airline staff, known from the local gay scene. In the past, one of
the main suspects had also worked as a purser for an airline company. At the airport, airline staff uses
a separate staff passage to move from landside to airside, and vice versa in the United States. In the
past, checks on this passage were negligible. The ecstasy pills are simply transported in pilot trolleys;
the offenders make no effort at all to hide the pills any further. As a consequence, of the tightening up
of checks at staff exits, a different mode of operation is adopted (Case 1).
It almost goes without saying that the daily activities performed by these individuals, in
combination with their specific privileges, presented them with the ideal opportunity to smuggle
drugs. Just as people were oblivious to skinners operating at any time of the day or night, so the
travel behaviour of these smugglers went without notice. What is interesting in this case is that
existing contacts with colleagues are also used to enter into new collaborative relations:
21. E.g. Joseph L. Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend (New York: Appleton, 1971); Francis
A.J. Ianni and Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni, A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972); William J. Chambliss, On the Take: From Petty Crooks to
Presidents (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978); James O. Finckenauer and Elin J. Waring,
Russian Mafia in America: Immigration, Culture, and Crime (Boston: Northeastern University Press,
1998); Kleemans and Van de Bunt, ‘The Social Embeddedness’; F. Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private
Protection in a New Market Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 737–67; Sheldon Zhang,
‘Enter the Dragon: Inside Chinese Human Smuggling Operations’, Criminology 40 (2002); Morselli,
Contacts, Opportunities, and Criminal Enterprise; Mangai Natarajan, ‘Understanding the Structure of a
Large Heroin Distribution Network: A Quantitative Analysis of Qualitative Data’, Journal of Quantitative
Criminology 22 (2006): 171–92.
22. Mars, Cheats at Work.
23. The four cases that are described in more detail concern monthly ecstasy transports (14 observed
ecstasy transports; total estimated amount of pills: 700,000), systematic tax fraud (over a 5-year period;
total estimated loss: more than 100 million Euro), frequent cocaine transports (monthly or every two weeks;
estimated amount of 15–40 kilo per transport), and oil fraud (over a 3-year period; total estimated loss:
more than 40 million Euro).
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At a certain moment, courier Y says he does not want to be involved in ecstasy transports any more.
Because of this, his ex boyfriend, who is also a steward, is asked whether he is willing to do this
(Case 1).
In the meantime, another crew member (C) has been found who is willing to do transports. C is
coincidentally rostered on a flight to a Canadian airport and A instructs him to see how checks are
carried out there, because A has a contact in Canada. Later on, money transports to The Netherlands
are also carried out from this airport (Case 1).
Contrary to the fruit dealer, who crossed over to illegal trade and, as such, had to use other social
contacts and different modes of transport, these stewards continue to do their normal work
alongside their criminal activities. The step from steward to ecstasy smuggler seems a
remarkably big one. In several other cases, the transition from ‘licit’ to ‘illicit’ was far less
radical. The illicit nature of activities was an extension of licit professional activities or could
barely be distinguished from them. Three different examples from our case file might illuminate
this: the transport company that transports legal cargos, but also systematically transports illegal
cargos and becomes part of a smuggling organisation; the tax and banking specialists, experts in
developing tax constructions, who use their collaboration to regularly pull off a fraud trick; or
baggage basement staff that collaborates on the misuse of the airport’s baggage handling system,
in order to smuggle cocaine.
The occupations indicated so far have the following in common: international contacts and
travel movements are a part of the daily activities. This makes these occupations attractive for
smuggling activities. However, it is striking that certain privileges are linked to these
occupations too, as a result of which these professionals have a relatively high degree of freedom
of movement or freedom of action. This autonomy is not only vital for the performance of their
tasks and duties, but also presents opportunities to overstep the mark unnoticed. The
anthropologist Mars elaborated on this in more detail in his book ‘Cheats at Work’.24 If one
wants to understand the nature and extent of work-related crime, Mars states it is important to
consider both the freedom or discretion the individual has (or does not have) in his work (the grid
dimension) and the collective of which he forms part (the group dimension).25
The more autonomy people have and, as such, are also able to determine the rules and decide
how and when to use their time, the more opportunities there are for abuse, as well. This often
involves well-paid professions with a high degree of trust. The offenders would seem to be above
suspicion.
Case 2 is an intriguing example of how such professionals meet each other in international
settings and use their knowledge and contacts in illegal ventures, in order to cheat the tax
authorities out of huge amounts of money:
Besides their normal licit activities, an international group from the social world of ‘haute finance’
are also involved in large-scale tax fraud. The fraud trick that is performed in different ways and in
different contexts consists, basically, of ‘corporate vampirism’. The group buys a private limited
company and makes sure that existing profits change into losses, through buying a.o. – hugely
overvalued – (exploitation) rights. Although, these rights are written down for depreciation, they do
24. Mars, Cheats at Work.
25. As an anthropologist, Mars places great emphasis on culture, but we prefer to reserve the grid
dimension for the organisational structure and formal social control, while reserving the group dimension
for informal social control (and organisational culture). We will also disregard his interesting typology,
which is derived from ecology (donkeys, wolves, hawks, vultures). This typology may be enlightening for
Mars’ purposes, but loses its value, in our opinion, when applied to crimes often committed in a group
context. The distinction between ‘hawks’ (that hunt alone and do not need to concern themselves overly
with the group) and ‘vultures’ (that operate independently, on the basis of a group with strong cohesion)
particularly loses its value in this application and is confusing rather than enlightening, Ibid.
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not generate any or barely any revenue at a later date. Almost immediately after buying the company,
a large part of the cash balance – actually the money reserved for the corporation tax due – is
withdrawn from the company.
The professionals know each other from the financial world. They meet each other at international
tax conferences. When they discuss legal affairs, ‘creativity is displayed’. Their fraud constructions
utilise the legal positions of the individuals concerned and their knowledge of suitable tax regimes,
suitable companies and suitable legal constructions. Two professionals also worked for the tax
authorities in the past, as a result of which they are familiar with the audit techniques and the timing
of these audits (Case 2).
The professionals from this case are tax advisers, lawyers, asset managers and/or directors of
companies. They live in an international world in which their day-to-day work consists of
looking for legal loopholes and constructions that make it possible to pay the smallest possible
amount of tax. Despite the very professional performance of the fraud trick, the tax authorities
eventually traced the fraud. This was not due to the alertness of the organisations that were
involved. Even for those who work in large organisations, it is striking how much trust is placed
in them, and how little monitoring there would seem to be with respect to their activities:26
One of the professionals works for a large bank. From his formal position at this bank, he is able to
legally bind the bank to the purchase and sale of legal entities. He abuses this position when buying
and selling companies (legal entities) that are used to commit fraud. In a certain period, a system
involving stricter monitoring is introduced at the bank. However, the monitoring committee depends
largely on material provided by the department, managed by the individual concerned. The main
reason for turmoil is a stupid mistake, when a briefcase with cash is left and found in the garage
(Case 2).
The opposite of this group of offenders is a work-related criminal network that does not protect
itself through autonomy, but through strong group loyalty. The group dimension of an
occupation relates to the nature of contacts between colleagues and the division between the
group and the outside world. For example, miners and dock workers are regarded as typical
examples of occupations with a strong group dimension, while entrepreneurs, scientists and
artists are examples of occupations with a weak group dimension. What is interesting about the
group dimension is that strong social cohesion may discourage deviant behaviour (positive
social control) but can promote it too, when different norms apply within a certain group. This is
also evident from Case 3. This case would seem to be an example of a relatively closed world of
low-paid employees with plenty of opportunities to make illegal extra earnings and also a certain
tolerance towards the extra earnings of this nature. The collective dimension is also evident from
the fact that a number of employees from the same company are involved in the criminal
activities at hand:
Scheduled flight traffic is used to smuggle cocaine from the Caribbean to The Netherlands, with the
collaboration of staff from a baggage handling company. Criminal activities in the baggage
basement at the airport are closely connected to the daily work performed by the offenders, i.e.
unloading airplanes. These staff hide backpacks with cocaine in suitcases that are transported in
containers, and sometimes also in individual suitcases. In general, this concerns transfer baggage. In
the baggage basement, staff remove the suitcase from the container, remove the backpack with
cocaine from the suitcase, and return the suitcase to the system. A member of staff takes the
backpack with cocaine from airside to landside via a turnstile, where no physical checks are
performed on incoming or outgoing staff. The members of staff work on airside, while the canteen is
26. A parallel could be drawn here with the ‘control balance’ theory developed by Charles R. Tittle,
Control Balance: Toward a General Theory of Deviance (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), a recent general
theory about criminal behaviour which has also been applied to organisational crime, Nicole Leeper
Piquero and Alex R. Piquero, ‘Control Balance and Exploitative Corporate Crime’, Criminology 44 (2006):
397–429.
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situated on landside. During breaks, staff members walk over to landside to eat, as a result of which
no one notices people walking back and forth between airside and landside. On landside, there is a
delivery road, a public road with a lot of incoming and outgoing traffic. Here, the backpack is passed
to another associate (Case 3).
Hence, in this case, the context of licit work, i.e. unloading airplanes, provides the opportunity
structure for criminal activities. In baggage handling, it is very difficult to distinguish, whether
staff members are engaged in licit activities or in criminal activities. Additional factors are the
time pressure when loading and unloading airplanes, the absence of effective checks between the
airside and landside, and the ‘closed’ world of the baggage basement. Investigating officers in
Case 3 emphasise the criminal atmosphere in the baggage basement and its ‘closed’ world,
where outsiders are spotted soon.
Just like the occupations that are mentioned by Blok,27 some occupations are better fit for
committing some types of crime than others. Occupations that are related to mobility and
logistics are a fertile breeding ground for smuggling activities. These occupations do not only
provide opportunities for smuggling, but also for concealment. Legitimate reasons for frequent
travelling do not evoke suspicion. Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to the aforementioned tax
experts. Their core activity, legitimate ‘tax planning’, is also very close to their core criminal
activities, in which they make use of the same knowledge, legal constructions and contacts as in
their daily work. This proximity of illegal activities might also account for the intriguing side
step of these professionals.
1.3.1 Work settings and organised crime
Work settings present good opportunities to gain trust in someone else when entering into
relationships, or to exercise control. Trust is important in organised crime, as these activities
involve significant financial and other risks.28 After all, the advantage is that colleagues already
know each other and, based on experience or reputation, they can assess whether a person is a
suitable co-offender. The position that one occupies in the organisation can sometimes be used
to make sure that specific persons are placed in a specific position:
Offender A has a leading role in one of the criminal groups studied, in which four of the six
suspects work for the same company. He is a coordinator in a cargo handling company and also
prepares the shift rosters. As a result, he is able to make sure that specific people work at specific
times. He does not have the power to recruit or dismiss staff. He selects suitable staff members
and approaches them. Earnings vary from 5000 to 20,000 Euros per suitcase. The member of
staff is rostered in on a specific day. Subsequently, this staff member will be told what the
suitcase containing the cocaine looks like and, where it is positioned in the container (Case 3).
Another criminal group, in which 11 of the 13 suspects work for the same company, pay a
coordinator to turn a blind eye. He rosters people for the handling of specific flights, based on the
information from one of the suspects (X). After some time, X and Y prepare the roster themselves
(Case 3).
27. Blok, Honour and Violence.
28. See, for example, Peter Reuter, Disorganized Crime: Illegal Markets and the Mafia (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1983); D. Gambetta, Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1988); Gary W. Potter, Criminal Organizations: Vice, Racketeering, and Politics in an
American City (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1994); Gerben Bruinsma and Wim Bernasco,
‘Criminal Groups and Transnational Illegal Markets: A More Detailed Examination on the Basis of Social
Network Theory’, Crime, Law and Social Change 41 (2004): 79–94; Klaus Von Lampe and Per Ole
Johansen, ‘Organized Crime and Trust: On the Conceptualization and Empirical Relevance of Trust in the
Context of Criminal Networks’, Global Crime 6 (2004): 159–84.
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In many cases, where criminal relations are embedded in work relations and work settings, there
are (close) social relationships too. For example, the bonds between the stewards in Case 1 were
partly forged in the local gay scene. Other cases also show that work relationships and social
relationships coincide:
The professionals from ‘haute finance’ organise ‘tax seminars’ for each other at exotic
destinations. The main objective is to strengthen the social bonds between collaborators from
different parts of the world. The main activities do not consist of lectures or meetings, but of golf,
fishing, lunching, and dining. The sizeable police file on this case contains photographs showing
the cheerful collaborators in a golf buggy, clearly having a very good time. Later on, successful
scams are celebrated together as well. Even an official trophy is produced for each successful
scam (Case 2).
Perhaps, this collective dimension may also provide an explanation for collective hubris. What is
striking about this case is that, although, the fraud trick was very professional – involving the
engagement of various legal entities and licit companies, trust offices, banks and bank accounts
in tax havens – it still is a trick that the tax authorities would have to find out sooner or later,
while various suspects – with senior positions and high salaries – had a lot to lose. Perhaps, this
could be described as some kind of ‘groupthink’, a phenomenon that is well-known from
research on crisis decision-making, when small groups, caught up in the interaction between the
members of the group, lose sight of reality, start to adopt different norms and values and
collective rationalisations, and display a sense of invulnerability and over-optimism.29
Social cohesion also plays a role in large-scale frauds in business sectors that are dominated
by independent entrepreneurs. For example, a large-scale oil fraud case illustrates the important
function of social cohesion between fraudulent ship captains:
The fraudulent captains come from a professional group in which many of them know each other and
know what is going on. Often, this profession is passed down from father to son. There are also
several family connections between the captains who are involved. Indirectly, the captains also know
about each other’s financial situation. This way, the message spreads easily that money can be earned
if defrauded oil from major clients (shipping and airline companies) is passed on to a certain
business. A good example involves two brothers, X and Y, who soon find their way to the fraudulent
business when they hit hard times. The oil finds its way back into the legal circuit through this
fraudulent business (Case 4).
Various fraud cases illustrate that business contacts can be used to easily pass on a certain fraud
trick to others, or to carry it out with various co-offenders.30 Business contacts are also important
to bring in other companies, which are often based in other countries, to facilitate credible fraud
constructions.
2. Conclusion
Research on occupations and organised crime speaks directly to the important theoretical
issues such as searching for suitable co-offenders and connections between the licit and the
illicit world.31 Many studies on organised crime tend to draw a sharp distinction between licit
activities and illicit activities and between the legitimate world and the underworld. Some
29. See also, Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).
30. For instance, Wayne E Baker and Robert R. Faulkner, ‘Diffusion of Fraud: Intermediate Economic
Crime and Investor Dynamics’, Criminology 41 (2003): 1176–83.
31. For a review, see, Albert J. Reiss Jr., ‘Co-Offending and Criminal Careers’, in Crime and Justice.
A Review of Research, ed. Michael Tonry and Norval Morris (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988),
117–70; Pierre Tremblay, ‘Searching for Suitable Co-Offenders’, in Routine Activity and Rational Choice,
ed. Ronald V. Clarke and Marcus Felson (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 17–36; Mark
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studies focus on the infiltration or extortion of licit economic sectors by organised crime, while
other studies tend to emphasise symbiosis and ‘interfaces’ between legal and illegal actors.32
Our research findings indicate that both worlds may converge. Occupations, work relations and
work settings may provide the breeding ground for organised crime activities, particularly
transit crime. There are different ways in which occupations may present opportunities for
committing organised crime. First, through international contacts and travel movements.
Contacts with other countries and other social groups provide ample opportunity to discover
and act on certain opportunities for (transit) crime. Examples are occupations involving
mobility, transport, and logistics. Secondly, the individual freedom of movement and/or
discretion is important. This explains the involvement of directors of (small) businesses,
independent professionals and, in some cases, individuals with relative autonomy in larger
organisations, such as companies and banks. More trust and autonomy means more opportunity
for abuse as well. Thirdly, the social nature of certain occupations is important. Occupations in
which people often meet with different people also present many opportunities for encounters
with potential co-offenders.
These main characteristics might explain the intriguing transition of some careers33 and
are also relevant in the context of ideas of brokerage – connecting disconnected others – for
explaining careers in organised crime.34 Furthermore, occupations offer work relations and
work settings that are directly relevant for providing opportunities to search for suitable
co-offenders, to gain trust and to exercise control. Social cohesion is important here too. In
this context, we referred to the work-related opportunity structures for independent
entrepreneurs. Close mutual social relations may cause a snowball effect, as a result of
which certain fraud methods are transferred to others or are implemented with various co-
offenders.35 In certain ‘closed’ social worlds, different norms may also emerge on what is
right and wrong, and rationalisations and justifications may promote and maintain illegal
behaviour.36
Social ties cross boundaries between legality and illegality, as do some work settings in
which people spend a considerable share of their daily life. Our research findings highlight the
salience of social relations, work relations and work settings for criminal activities, also in cases
of organised crime. Of course, our empirical findings should not be misinterpreted as findings
from a representative sample. Yet, from a theoretical point of view, these findings are important
in bridging ideas from the social network theory and opportunity theory. Social relations are
influenced by ‘foci of interaction’.37 Social relations do not happen at random but often obey the
laws of social and geographical distance, producing a certain kind of clustering based on
(Footnote 31 continued)
Warr, Companions in Crime: The Social Aspects of Criminal Conduct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002);
Waring and Weisburd, eds., Crime and Social Organization.
32. E.g. Passas, ‘Cross-Border Crime’; Edgar Tijhuis, Transnational Crime and the Interface between
Legal and Illegal Actors: The Case of the Illicit Art and Antiquities Trade (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal
Publishers, 2006).
33. Kleemans and De Poot, ‘Criminal Careers’.
34. E.g. Morselli, ‘Structuring Mr. Nice’, Ibid., ‘Career Opportunities’, Ibid., Contacts, Opportunities, and
Criminal Enterprise.
35. E.g. Baker and Faulkner, ‘Diffusion of Fraud’.
36. Gresham M. Sykes and David Matza, ‘Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency’,
American Sociological Review 22 (1957): 664–70; Shadd Maruna and Heith Copes, ‘Excuses, Excuses:
What Have We Learned from Five Decades of Neutralization Research?’ Crime and Justice. A Review of
Research 32 (2005).
37. Scott L. Feld, ‘The Focused Organization of Social Ties’, American Journal of Sociology 86
(1981):1015–35.
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geographical distance, ethnicity, education, age, etc.38 For many people, work is also an
important focus of interaction. Secondly, social relations and work relations often coincide,
either because people find a job through social relations or because working relationships
develop into more or less close social relations. Thirdly, the blending of work relations and
social relations may also contribute to the effective concealment of illegal activities. For a
variety of reasons, potential witnesses may remain silent, look the other way, or feel reluctant to
blow the whistle. Effective concealment does not require secret societies. ‘Walls of silence’ may
also emerge in licit worlds that are mobile, dynamic and social.39 Finally, some people seize
upon illegal opportunities, while others do not. Clearly, there is both ‘agency’ and
‘opportunity’.40 The question why, when confronted with opportunities, some people turn to
crime and others do not, and under which conditions, is not resolved and needs further
exploration.
Until recently routine activity theory and opportunity theory have focused primarily on street
crime, but several theoretical ideas are worthwhile to explore within the context of organised
crime.41 Particularly relevant is Felson’s work on routine activity theory and, more recently, his
ideas about offender convergence settings:42
An offender convergence setting provides crime structure and continuity – despite instabilities
among individuals, groups, or networks . . . The main point is that some settings facilitate criminal
action, whatever the type, however inadvertently, and regardless of the initial reasons that people
have entered.43
Although Felson has mainly applied these ideas to street crime and other conventional crimes, it
would be important to explore his ideas more widely within the context of the organised crime.44
Furthermore, routine activities play a key role in discovering and exploiting opportunities that are
presented in daily work settings. By merging ideas from social network theory and opportunity
theory,45 one might avoid two common fallacies of theories on organised crime: either presenting
an ‘oversocialised’ view on the organisation of crime or an ‘undersocialised’ and oversimplified
38. E.g. Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Ibid.,
Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
39. Henk Van de Bunt, ‘Muren Van Stilzwijgen’, in Drie Perspectieven Op Sociale Controle, ed. Henk
Van de Bunt, Rene´ Van Swaaningen, and Pieter Spierenburg (Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers,
2007), 113–36.
40. John H. Laub and Robert J. Sampson, Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives: Delinquent Boys to Age 70
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
41. See also, Derek B. Cornish and Ronald V. Clarke, ‘Analyzing Organized Crimes’, in Rational Choice
and Criminal Behavior: Recent Research and Future Challenges, ed. Alex R. Piquero and Stephen
G. Tibbetts (New York: Routledge Press, 2002), 41–62; Henk Van de Bunt and Cathelijne van der Schoot,
eds., Prevention of Organised Crime: A Situational Approach (Collumpton: Willan Publishing, 2003);
Marcus Felson, Crime and Nature (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2006); Ibid., ‘The Ecosystem for Organized
Crime’, in HEUNI Papers (Helsinki: HEUNI, 2006); Edward R. Kleemans, ‘Introduction to Special Issue:
Organized Crime, Terrorism and European Criminology’, European Journal of Criminology 5 (2008):
5–12; Carlo Morselli and Julie Roy, ‘Brokerage Qualifications in Ringing Operations’, Criminology 46
(2008): 71–98.
42. E.g. Ronald V. Clarke and Marcus Felson, ‘Introduction: Criminology, Routine Activity, and Rational
Choice’, in Routine Activity and Rational Choice, ed. Ronald V. Clarke and Marcus Felson (New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 1–14; Marcus Felson, ‘The Process of Co-Offending’, Crime
Prevention Studies 16 (2003): 149–17; Ibid., Crime and Nature.
43. Felson, Crime and Nature 98–99.
44. Ibid., ‘The Ecosystem for Organized Crime’.
45. E.g. Morselli and Roy, ‘Brokerage Qualifications’.
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picture of ‘disorganised’ crime. Social relations as well as settings and opportunity structures
provide structure to the organisation of many forms of crime, including organised crime.
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